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CLASSICAL WRITERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
By Forest L. Grieves* 
I. 
Mindful of Hegel's observation in his PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY that 
man has never learned from history nor acted on principles deduced 
from it, the writer of this article is not so sanguine as to expect that 
solutions to twentieth century environmental difficulties will neces-
sarily be found in medieval legal norms.l 
Nevertheless, many of the international legal difficulties encoun-
tered today stem from legal principles we inherited from the classi-
cal period of international law-principles that were developed to 
meet then current problems. Consequently, a look at the past can 
illuminate the background of the principles we are trying to apply 
in modern international efforts to control the environment. This is 
especially true in the areas of pollution, conservation, and jurisdic-
tion which attracted the attention of earlier writers. Further, the 
perspective offered by an occasional encounter with history is of 
value in itself. 
The United Nations, in its continuing efforts to evolve interna-
tional environmental law for such areas as outer space and the 
earth's oceans, repeatedly faces the same kinds of legal dilemmas 
that concerned earlier legal scholars. At the recent Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, for example, opposing 
views on the basic issue of national versus international claims to 
jurisdiction over the seas were cast very much along lines developed 
by Roman jurists, as modified by the classical writers of interna-
tionallaw. Modem nation-states are merely continuing that modi-
fying and up-dating process as they grope for legal means of environ-
mental control in the face of growing world-wide concern over lim-
ited resources and the apparent inability to control their exploita-
tion. The search for a legal regime to regulate the international 
environment becomes more intelligible when viewed in historical 
context. 
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II. 
Speaking at the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the American 
Society ofInternational Law, Dean Pound noted: "We await a jurist 
with the mastery of the legal materials, the philosophical vision, 
and the juristic faith which enabled Grotius to set up a law of 
nations almost at one stroke."2 However, Hugo Grotius himself, 
often called the Father of International Law, relied very heavily on 
historical guidance.3 
In preparing to treat the issues of war and peace, Grotius wrote 
in the Prolegomena to his DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS: 
History in relation to our subject is useful in two ways: it supplies both 
illustrations and judgements. (sic) The illustrations have greater weight 
in proportion as they are taken from better times and better peoples; 
thus we have preferred ancient examples, Greek and Roman, to the rest. 
And judgements (sic) are not to be slighted, especially when they are in 
agreement with one another; for by such statements the existence of the 
law of nature, as we have said, is in a measure proved, and by no other 
means, in fact, is it possible to establish the law of nations.' 
Even a cursory survey of such other classical writers as Suarez, 
Vattel, Wolff, Gentili, Bynkershoek, Zouche, Pufendorf and Textor 
(the writers primarily under consideration in this study) reveals a 
bewildering hodgepodge of "authorities". An observation made 
about DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS is largely valid for the other authors 
just cited: "Here are jurists and comic poets, theologians and mas-
ters of strategy, saints and politicians, geographers and Greek gods, 
historians and tragedians all marching side by side, and all furnish-
ing grist for Grotius' legal mill."5 Among all the authorities cited, 
however, Grotius relied surprisingly little on the more positive 
sources of law such as treaties, court decisions, foreign office corre-
spondence and other official documentary records. 
Whatever the source of the "illustrations and judgements," inter-
national legal norms were evolving and crystalizing during Grotius' 
time. Perhaps then we can find material of relevance to modern 
problems by examining the developing classical international law. 
Classical writers probed all the then perceived causes of social 
conflict. Of particular interest to this study is the treatment of 
issues relevant to the environment. There are minor references to 
water pollution, somewhat more concern for conservation- espe-
cially relating to fisheries, and much interest in jurisdiction and to 
all the forms in which it appears, such as ownership, dominion, 
control, assertions of title, and claims to exclusive use. Questions of 
jurisdiction might not appear to be of immediate importance to 
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environmental problems, but in fact jurisdictional questions are the 
most basic of all, cutting across all other issues. If a clear lesson has 
emerged from modern attempts to control international environ-
mental abuse, it is that, even if we can achieve scientific/technical 
agreement on the nature of a problem, we are still a long way from 
managing it until we can resolve the jurisdictional issues relating to 
who should control and be responsible for the international environ-
ment. 
Ill. 
The classical references to pollution are few, and even then in a 
context which makes them appear to be little more than footnotes 
to rules of warfare. Grotius writes in Book ill of his DE JURE BELLI 
AC PACIS a chapter entitled "On the Right of Killing Enemies." In 
that chapter he cautions: 
The poisoning of springs also, though the act either is not secret or 
does not long remain so, is said by Florus to be not only contrary to 
ancestral custom but also contrary to the law of the gods; just as we have 
pointed out elsewhere, writers frequently ascribe the laws of nations to 
the gods. It should not indeed seem remarkable if there exist some such 
tacit agreements among belligerents to lessen the risks of war .... 8 
He goes on to qualify his guideline by noting, in a section entitled 
"It is not forbidden by the law of nations to pollute waters in an-
other way," that "The rule just stated has not been established in 
regard to the pollution of waters without the use of poison [he refers 
in a note to the use of corpses, asbestos, and lime] in such a way 
that one cannot drink from them."7 He cites evidence of the past 
customary use of such pollution, particularly against barbarians.8 
Neither Grotius nor any of the other classical writers discussed 
here appeared to express any concern for the non-intentional pollu-
tion of the environment. Their frame of reference was purposeful 
pollution as a possible tactic of warfare, not pollution as the by-
product of an industrial world. The shift from sullying the environ-
ment to exploitation of its resources is minor, but it was most impor-
tant to pre-technological societies with their limited ability to ex-
tract resources from nature. In terms of the international environ-
ment, classical writers focused their attention on the use and conser-
vation of the resources of the sea-primarily fishing. 
IV. 
The classical writers viewed fish, fowl and wild animals as res 
nullius, a concept taken from old Roman law. The Romans had an 
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elaborate legal classification scheme for every "thing" (res). The 
philosophy of the law was based on the proposition that all things 
initially belonged to no one (res nullius); but as man came to terms 
with his environment, varying concepts of property developed. Fish, 
fowl and wild animals were things resistant to ownership, but could 
be claimed by a person if he could capture them. The meaning of 
the res nullius concept is that no one owns the thing in its wild state; 
it is simply there, free for the taking.9 
In the case of fish, an important food resource, a large fishery 
industry appeared in the Mediterranean. Since the resource was 
resistant to private ownership and apparently plentiful, the devel-
oping Roman law reflected an "international" perspective and a 
sense of community spirit rather than a selfish nationalist orienta-
tion. The Romans supported principles such as freedom of the seas 
and freedom to exploit the sea's resources by all nations even after 
Rome became powerful enough to assert effectively a contrary posi-
tion. lO 
As years passed, legal writers were still asserting these principles, 
but were discussing them in terms of God's will, a universal sense 
of fairness, and a rejection of human greed. The fruits of the seas 
were still regarded as being plentiful, but there was a growing reali-
zation that such resources were not inexhaustible-at least in cer-
tain places and times. Nations began to get caught up in the famil-
iar international minuet of competing claims as developing navies, 
geographical discoveries, increased commercial relations, and grow-
ing populations focused attention on the sea. 
During the seventeenth century Pufendorf addressed this growing 
problem of increased national interest in "international" resources. 
He wrote: 
Such was the generosity of God towards men that He supplied them 
abundantly with what serves their needs. But reason prescribed to men 
such bounds of possession, as would leave them content upon acquiring 
what would be likely to meet the needs of themselves and of their depen-
dents. Nor yet does it want them to take no thought for the future, 
provided their envy and craving for more then they need do not prevent 
others from providing for their own necessities. If any person ranges too 
far afield and heaps up superfluous wealth by the oppression of others, 
the rest will not be blamed if, when opportunity affords, they undertake 
promptly to bring him into line. 11 
Pufendorf then reiterated the common arguments for freedom of 
the sea. "The moral reason why ownership is not suitable to the 
sea," he concluded, "is drawn from the consideration that its use is 
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inexhaustible and therefore sufficient for the general service of all, 
so that it is idle to wish to assign parts of it to individuals."12 The 
free use of the sea was not without qualification, however, as Pufen-
dorf allowed: "We would certainly consider this the final argument 
if it were established that the sea in all its use is sufficient for all 
men in every part; for the purpose of introducing the right of prop-
erty over things is to preserve peace in human society."13 
So, while a free and open ocean makes sense in principle, Pufen-
dorf is forced to admit that in the interest of both conservation and 
social harmony, property claims to parts of the sea and its resources 
also make sense. He notes that the sea is not prejudiced by use for 
navigation or bathing, 
but there are other uses as well of the sea besides these, some of which 
are not entirely inexhaustible, while others are capable of giving occa-
sion of loss to a people lying on it [e.g., avenues of attack or defense 
considerations], so that for such a reason it is not true that all parts of 
the sea are open to the promiscuous use of every man. Into the former 
class fall fishing and the collection of things that grow in the sea. Now 
although fishing usually yields much more in the sea than in rivers and 
lakes, yet it is clear that fishing can be partially exhausted and become 
less profitable to maritime peoples, if any and every nation should want 
to fish along some particular shores; especially since it often happens 
that fish or things of value, such as pearls, coral, and amber, are found 
in only one part and that not very extensive, in the sea. In such cases 
nothing prevents the people dwelling along that shore or neighboring sea 
from being able to lay a stronger claim to its felicity than those who 
dwell at a distance, nor can the rest of mankind rightfully hate or envy 
them for this. . . .J( 
We can only speculate about the extent to which men like Pufen-
dorf foresaw the future. While international legal writers of the sev-
enteenth century may have wondered at the increasing numbers of 
whaling fleets setting out from western European ports, there is no 
expression of particular concern in their writings. We find only un-
easy concern, as in the passage cited above, for the ordered develop-
ment and use of the seas. We find hints, but never bold assertions 
by the classical writers, that the future might overwhelm them. 
Could a Pufendorf have anticipated mighty whaling fleets, aided by 
helicopters, sonar, harpoons with explosive heads, and modern fac-
tory ships that can process a giant whale carcass in half an hour, 
ranging to the farthest corners of the globe, driving some species of 
whales to the brink of extinction?15 Could a Pufendorf have forseen 
the modern fleets of trawlers, using the latest fruits of man's elec-
tronic genius and intimate scientific knowledge of ocean life-cycles, 
-- " 
, 
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in the relentless pursuit of varied species of fish and other ocean 
dwellers? 
Whether or not scientific progress was anticipated, the interna-
tionallegal dilemnas were already becoming clear. Pufendorf's ob-
servations noted above were representative of the attempt to inte-
grate theoretically international resources and national interest. 
Assertions of national interest have a tendency to be resolved in 
favor of the nation with the most battalions and the classical writers 
of international law were not unaware of this. Although each often 
wrote as unabashed spokesman for his own nation's interest, all 
were nevertheless concerned with the maintenance of some sembl-
ance of international order. This meant that they all had to face at 
. some point the fact, later articulated by Harold Lasswell, that poli-
tics is "who gets what, when and how."18 
In the international context, the Lasswellian view of politics sug-
gests that, regardless of general principles of international conduct 
to the contrary, nations will attempt to exert influence over the use 
and distribution of resources which they consider necessary to their 
individual well being. Roman and Greek legal scholars had to face 
the issues of property and jurisdiction internally; the classical writ-
ers of international law had to face them in an international context. 
Indeed, much of man's encounter with the international environ-
ment, as with the domestic environment,has raised questions of: 
Who owns what? Who controls what? Who gets the use of what? 
v. 
As developing international relations and the concomitant diffi-
culties of increased contact raised cries for social order, some au-
thority had to be found to meet the new conditions. European inter-
national legal scholars relied heavily on principles derived from 
Roman law, much of which was concerned with property relation-
shipsY The genesis of Roman property concepts is not entirely 
clear,t8 but the predominant view was that man's history revolved 
around the progressive assertion of ownership claims to the world 
in which man found himself. Res nullius areas became subjected to 
property claims to the extent that discovery, occupation and con-
temporary technology permitted. For those areas not apparently 
susceptible to occupation, the Roman jurists devised the concept of 
res communis, or community property, open to use by all. In this 
category were air, running water, the sea, and the shores of the sea. ID 
Jurisdictional positions concerning running water and seashores 
have largely been worked out. Air and outer space are of relatively 
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modern concern. Most of our history has revolved around the sea, 
and the principles evolved with respect to its use will be of no small 
relevance to air space and outer space. 
Emmerich de Vattel, like the other writers of the period, at-
tempted to explain and clarify the status of the sea. Like the others, 
he faced the conceptual difficulty of international common property 
versus national interest. The following passage illustrates the clash 
between ideas of free access to and use of the sea and the disruptive 
impact of inevitable national claims: 
The high seas are not of such a nature as to admit of actual occupa-
tion, since no .one can so take possession of them as to prevent others 
from using them. But a Nation powerful at sea might forbid others to 
fish in it or navigate it by declaring that it has appropriated the owner-
ship of it and will destroy vessels which undertake to navigate it without 
permission. Let us see if it would have a right to do so. 
It is clear that the use of the high seas for purposes of navigation and 
fishing is innocent in character and inexhaustible; that is to say, one 
who sails the high seas or who fishes therein injures no one, and the sea 
in both these respects can satisfy the needs of all men. Now, nature does 
not give men the right to appropriate things the use of which is innocent 
and the supply inexhaustible and sufficient for all; for since each one 
can obtain from the sea, as common property, what will satisfy his 
wants, the attempt to make oneself sole master of it and to exclude 
others would be depriving them unreasonably of the blessings of nature. 
As the earth, in its uncultivated state, did not furnish the human race, 
when it had multiplied greatly, with all necessary and useful products, 
it was found convenient to introduce the right of ownership, so that each 
one might apply himself with greather success to cultivate the share 
which fell to his lot, and to increase by his industry the various necessi-
ties of life. That is why the natural law approves of the rights of private 
ownership, which put an end to the common property of primitive 
times.20 
Vattel goes on to explain that the high seas cannot be claimed as 
property, that they must remain free and open for common use 
because of their vastness and inexhaustible nature. Any attempt to 
assert a claim Vattel regarded as very serious, and noted: "Since, 
then, the right of navigating and fishing on the high seas is common 
to all men, the Nation which undertakes to exclude another from 
that advantage does it an injury and gives just cause for war; for 
nature authorizes a Nation to repel an attack; that is, to resist with 
force any attempt to deprive it of its rights. "21 
He does acknowledge, as did Pufendorf, Grotius and others, that 
the special conservation status of certain exhaustible resources 
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(fish, shells, pearls and amber, for example) might allow for na-
tional claims. "A Nation may appropriate such things," he wrote, 
"as would be hurtful or dangerous to it if open to free and common 
use; and this is . . . why the Powers extend their sovereignty over 
the seas along their coasts, as far as they can protect their rights."22 
He saw no problem with the high seas, however, as that area was 
vast enough for everyone.23 
Whether or not we accept Vattel's premises concerning natural 
law and property rights, his stand was typical of what other writers 
were saying;24 and the thrust of his arguments made sense in the 
context of contemporary international politics. Nations had been 
maneuvering against one another in asserting claims to the use and 
control of the seas, the most ambitious being Spanish and Portu-
guese pretentions to dividing up the world's oceans in the 15th and 
16th centuries. In fact, the young lawyer Hugo Grotius first at-
tracted attention by writing a legal opinion supporting the Dutch 
East India Company in the battle with the Portuguese over the right 
to trade with the Indies in the 17th century.25 
While these writers were attempting to establish some sense of 
international legal order for the sea by treating it as a common 
resource, they were siml.dtaneously undercutting that concept by 
acknowledging the right of littoral states to make claims to the 
borders of the sea. This conflict could perhaps be papered over for 
the time being, but the inexorable advance of history would see 
nations developing increased technical capabilities for using the sea 
and its resources. As means and opportunity to exploit the sea ex-
panded, so did nations' interest in asserting claims over it. 
VI. 
The classical writers could be relatively smug in their view of the 
high seas as res communis because no country had either the means 
or the national need to claim the oceans. In fact, the writers at-
tempted to demonstrate the physical impossibility of claiming 
chunks of water, examining such issues as geometric subdivision in 
reference to the stars, the problem of effective occupation, and the 
maintenance of impossibly large fleets-all by way of arguing that 
such claims would serve no purpose anyway. Of the two uses of the 
seas conceivable to them, navigation and fishing, the former was a 
non-prejudicial use and the latter depended upon a resource that 
moved freely through the oceans and hence could not be contained 
by man's jurisdictional claims. Finally, they mocked the absurd 
claims that various nations had made to parts of the oceans.28 
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The narrowness of the legal doctrine articulated by these writers 
is explained, naturally enough, by the limited use to which the seas 
had been put over the centuries. A modem study of sea law suggests 
that "perhaps the first innovation in ocean use to raise serious ques-
tions about rights of access was. . . the exploration and exploita-
tion of the continental shelf."27 This innovation spurred and was 
spurred by interest in military uses and the scientific search for 
protein foods and for minerals. In more recent years attention has 
focused as well on the issues of pollution and conservation. The 
resolution of all these issues hinges ultimately on the nature of the 
regime that can be established for international areas such as the 
seas and the air. United Nations efforts to bring order to outer space 
and to the seas, as indicated below, bring to light some of the prob-
lems in creating such a regime. 
The original property divisions, in which earlier writers saw man 
participating, stopped when all of the earth's surface susceptible to 
occupation had been divided. Modem man has the capability to go 
further. To preclude an "Oklahoma land-grab" mentality from tak-
ing over as nations race to beat others to new claims, some clear 
international legal guidelines are needed to control the potential for 
serious conflict. Without waiting for a latter-day Grotius, we can try 
to make the legal heritage of the classical writers relevant to the 
present and the future. We need not become entangled in old no-
tions of natural law or rationales for the genesis of property claims; 
the basic issue in modern times is who will have authority over, who 
will have control of, international areas.28 
The old legal notions of res communis and res nullius offer a 
framework within which the international environment can be regu-
lated. For obvious political reasons, nations in the past have tried 
to support both concepts. Support of the res communis position was 
easy when nations had neither capability to nor interest in occupy-
ing the seas. Nations could insure their rights of free access to the 
seas by insisting that they be treated as a common resource. Simul-
taneously, a strong element of res nullius runs through the thinking 
about international areas like the seas. Philip Jessup argued some 
years ago that there was little practical difference between the two 
concepts because "under either theory it remains generally true that 
the sea is free to all .... "28 That view was perhaps true before the 
technology of the twentieth century increased nations' ability to 
expand into and even under the oceans:While much of that ability 
still exists mainly on paper, international law must be ready to help 
avoid the inevitable conflicts if possible, or at least resolve them 
after they arise. 
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The res nullius concept implies susceptibility to occupation or 
ownership. It has been the rationale for claiming a license to exploit 
living resources of the sea and for expanding national control over 
the seas. The cavalier attitudes of some states toward their "right" 
to take as many animals from the sea as they can get, the 
unilaterally-declared "conservation zones" many miles out into the 
sea, and the hungry national maneuvering vis-a-vis the continental 
shelf and deep sea beds show that international attitudes on the res 
communis/res nullius status to international areas have not been 
solidified. Modern sea law. rests in part on both of these con-
cepts-res nullius serving as a basis for such claims as those to 
territorial waters and the continental shelf while res communis con-
tinues to militate against appropriation of the high seas. 
The res nullius concept suggests obvious consequences-the 
weaker, less developed nations will lose out in any future "grab" for 
the oceans, and the powerful, technologically advanced nations may 
end up fighting. The res communis concept, on the other hand, 
posits that international areas are incapable of exclusive appropria-
tion by any state, and that exploitation of such areas must fall 
under some kind of international authorization. The difficulty with 
the community concept is that community ventures all too often 
yield to dominant national interests, as much of the history of the 
United Nations and other multinational organizations reveals.30 
Nations have become increasingly urgent in advocating the res 
communis status for international areas.3t The Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestrial Bodies, 
which went into force in October, 1967, is one example.32 The res 
communis concept clearly underlies the following articles: 
Article 1. The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be 
free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any 
kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, 
and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate 
and encourage international co-operation in such investigation. 
Article 2. Outer space, including the moon and other celestrial bodies, 
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use or occupation, or by any other means. 
WRITERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 
Critics might suggest that the res communis attitude is a clois-
tered virtue at this point, because access to the heavens is as limited 
now as it was for the high seas when the classical writers were trying 
to clarify the status of the oceans. The real test will come when some 
nation discovers vast oil fields on the moon and invents a super-
tanker for use in space. Rather than predict gloom for the future, 
however, it makes sense to examine current efforts of states to adopt 
a legal regime that will guide them into the future with a minimum 
of international conflict. An example of these efforts was the prepa-
ration for the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Seas in 
Caracas, Venezuela, where major attention focused on the sea bed. 
There seems to be strong interest in extending the res communis 
idea to the sea bed. The General Assembly Declaration of Principles 
Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdictions, declared: 
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as 
well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind. 
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by 
States or persons, natural and juridical, and no State shall claim or 
exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.33 
While the Caracas session of the U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea did not produce agreement on substantive issues, the ses-
sion nevertheless represented an effort to confront sea law problems. 
The idea of res communis, the "common heritage of mankind," can 
assist in modem attempts to solve the international problem of 
maintaining global order. Until the "property" status of the oceans 
is clarified and accepted by all, there will be continuous potential 
for international instability. We cannot deal coherently with pollu-
tion and conservation while the taking from and dumping into the 
"no man's land" of the oceans are "free" and uncontrolled. The res 
communis concept gives us a vehicle for stabilizing and guiding the 
use of international areas, because it militates against the unilateral 
and often uncontrolled exploitation of "international" resources 
extracted from and under the seas. 
-.~~-
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1 However, if our ecological predicament is as desperate as some 
scientists claim, perhaps even historical musings are worth a try! 
Contemporary efforts by scholars, national governments and agen-
cies, and international organizations to meet the environmental 
challenge are not lacking. See, e.g., F. Grieves, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
ORGANIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH 
GUIDE, 1974 (University of Arizona, Institute of Government Re-
search). 
2 Pound, The Idea of Law in International Relations, 1939 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERIC~ SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10, 23. 
3 Sandifer, Rereading Grotius in the Year 1940, 34 AMERICAN J. 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 459 (1940). A critic of the Grotian penchant 
for history comments: "Reluctance to break with the past explains 
not only the terminology but also the lack of clarity, the prolixity 
and irrelevance of the DE JURE, its tendency to pile up quotations 
from past authorities for every statement, even if it also helped to 
obtain for the book a greater influence .... " See F.H. Hinsley, 
SOVEREIGNTY 187 (1966). 
4 2 H. Grotius, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, LIBRI TRES 26 (1946 ed. 
F. Kelsey et al. transl. 1925). 
5 Sadifer, supra n. 3, at 460. 
• 2 H. Grotius, supra n. 4, at 653. 
7Id. 
8Id. 
B A good discussion of the Roman views on property appears in 
P. Fenn, Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea, 19 AM. J. OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 716 (1925). The ancient Greeks did not have the same 
classification of res as the Romans, but apparently viewed fish and 
wild animals in much the same way. Id. at 719 note. 
10Id. at 716-17. These principles were supported by such men as 
Polybius, Cicero, Seneca, Plautus and Ovid. 
11 2 S. Pufendorf, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, LIBRI OCTO 567 
(1688 ed. C. and W. Oldfather transl. 1934). 
12 Id. at 561. 
13 Id. at 561-62. 
14 Id. at 562. He cites Vergil here: "Not every land bears every-
thing; India sends us her ivory, the soft Sabaeans their frankin-
cense." 
15 For an international legal discussion of the fate of the whales, 
see Grieves, Leviathan, the International Whaling Commission and 
Conservation as Environmental Aspects of International Law, 25 
WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 711 (1972). 
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16 See M. Lasswell, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How 
(1936) . 
17 For a discussion of this point see Crichton, Grotius on the Free-
dom of the Seas, 53 JURIDICAL REV. 226 (1941). At 226 he cites John 
Westlake to the effect that "a door was opened for the introduction 
into international law under the name of the law of nature of no 
small part of the private law of Rome on obligation as well as prop-
erty." See COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 10, 134 (1914). 
18 See Ruddy, Res Nullius and Occupation in Roman and Inter-
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